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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University 
of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which will 
conclude in the Spring of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for a new 
framework and process of restructuring the European Union.  While the European Union has been 
successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern 
challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and 
abroad.  The main issues of this Convention are Europe’s role in the international community, the 
concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process.  In order for efficiency and 
progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without 
jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization.  During the Convention proceedings, the Jean 
Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current 
Convention issues but also analyze  various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European 
capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have 
to understand each other?  Under what conditions? 
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and 
Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
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In the late 1990s, some prominent Canadian economists – notably Thomas Courchene, Herbert 
Grubel, Richard Harris, and Robert Mundell – began arguing that a North American common 
currency would solve the problems underlying the growing gap between U.S. and Canadian real 
GDP per capita.
1 They succeeded in provoking a lively economic policy debate that occurred in 
parallel with the launch of the euro. The purpose of this paper is to examine the uses – and 
abuses – of European parallels by both sides in the economic policy debate that peaked in the 
1999-2001 period.  
 
  The body of the paper begins by providing an understanding of the European case. 
Hence, the second section outlines our interpretation of the major developments in the birth of 
the euro. The third section, the core of the paper, examines in detail the use of European parallels 
in the Canadian currency debate. We start by providing a brief overview of the protagonists in 
the debate. We then continue by arguing that the euro provided a “temporal spur” for the 
Canadian discussion but that it was only one among several important factors. We argue further 
that the proponents of a North American common currency relied very little on the European 
experience to support their case for the need for a common currency. Where they did use the 
European experience, however, was in their analysis of the institutional form that a common 
currency in North America might take. We argue that the opponents of a North American 
common currency were correct in viewing this as an abuse of the European parallel. In the 
concluding fourth section, we summarize our findings and argue that the most important parallel 
between the European and North American forces for a common currency is that both were 
driven primarily by politics.  
 
The Road to European Monetary Union
2 
In Europe – or, more precisely, in twelve out of the fifteen countries forming the European 
Community (EC) – a common currency, the Euro, replaced national currencies on January 1, 
2002. The process leading to the adoption of a common currency was long and complex. This 
section retraces its three  most salient phases, each characterized by a distinct project, and 
analyses the reasons and driving forces behind each of these projects.  
 
The EC did not devote much attention to monetary issues in its early years because the 
common market operated with practically fixed exchange rates, by virtue of its member states 
belonging to the Bretton Woods system. When this system began to unravel in the late 1960s, it 
                                                           
1 Courchene and Harris are Past Presidents of the Canadian Economics Association. Mundell, the recipient of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1999, resides in the United States but grew up in, and maintains ties with, Canada. 
2 This section is an expanded revision of a section in Bowles, Croci, and MacLean, “Globalization and Currency 
Convergence: What do the Regions Tell Us? In James Busumtwi-Sam and Laurent Dobuzinskis (eds.), Turbulence 
and New Directions in Global Political Economy (New York: Palgrave, 2003 [forthcoming]).   2 
became evident that exchange rate fluctuations could pose a problem for the proper functioning 
of the common market, and would be particularly disruptive for the administration of the 
Common Agricultural Policy.
3 To remedy the problem, as well as to facilitate trade and promote 
further economic and political integration, the EC adopted in 1971 an ambitious plan (the 
Werner Report) for economic and monetary union to be achieved in stages by 1980. The first 
stage, a modest scheme known as the "snake" that limited the range of exchange rate fluctuations 
of the participating currencies, was launched in April 1972. To the objective difficulty of trying 
to establish a regional zone of stability in the midst of global monetary turbulence, member states 
added their pursuit of conflicting macroeconomic policy goals during an unprecedented period of 
stagflation. While Germany, for instance, pursued a restrictive monetary policy to control 
inflation, other member states implemented expansionary policies to try to encourage growth and 
employment. The result was that the “snake” ran immediately into trouble. A wave of currency 
speculation pushed half of the participating currencies outside the established exchange rate 
margins and by 1974, the “snake” was reduced to a limited Deutschmark zone. Consequently, 
the goal of achieving monetary union was abandoned, although not for long.  
 
In April 1978, in fact, German Social-Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and 
French President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing resurrected the idea because both thought that 
adoption of a quasi-fixed European exchange rate system would help them attain preferred 
domestic economic policy objectives. Schmidt wished to adopt an expansionary policy with a 
view to the 1980 elections but had to overcome the doubts of some members of his coalition 
government and the Bundesbank's traditional commitment to price stability. As he saw it, 
German participation in a managed exchange rate system would slow the appreciation of the 
mark (and thus help German industry retain competitiveness) and act as a constraint on the 
Bundesbank, pushing it towards the adoption of a less restrictive monetary policy. For Giscard 
D’Estaing committing the franc to a managed exchange rate system was a way to enlist French 
industrialists in the struggle against inflation by convincing them that they could no longer hope 
to maintain international competitiveness by means of periodical de-valuations and, hence, 
encourage them to resist any wage increases not reflecting improvements in productivity.
4 The 
outcome of this Franco-German initiative was the European Monetary System (EMS) that began 
to operate in March 1979. Its central component was the Exchange Rate Mechanism, limiting the 
exchange rate fluctuations of most member currencies to plus or minus 2.25 per cent of 
predetermined parities. The EMS proved more successful than the ‘snake’, although some 
currencies were repeatedly obliged to leave it, and then devalue before rejoining.
5 
 
In 1987, EC member governments ratified the so-called Single European Act (SEA) that 
aimed at “completing” the common market by removing all remaining non-tariff barriers to the 
free movement of goods, people, services, and capital by the end of 1992. The success of this 
                                                           
3 Kathleen McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), pp. 98-104. 
4 Thomas H. Oatley, Monetary Politics: Exchange Rate Cooperation in the European Union (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 48-56. 
5 On these first two attempts at monetary integration in Europe, see Loukas Tsoukalis, The Politics and Economics 
of European Monetary Integration (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977); D.C. Kruse, Monetary Integration in 
Western Europe: EMU, EMS and Beyond (London: Butterworth, 1980); and Peter Ludlow, the Making of the 
European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community (London: Butterworth, 1982). 
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initiative gave new impetus to the integration process and enabled the European Commission to 
put again on the EC agenda the project of economic and monetary union (EMU) to be achieved 
in three stages. The official justification for the project was that monetary union was a natural 
and logical complement of a single European market. Once a single market was in place, EC 
member states would have to confront the dilemma of what Cohen called the “unholy trinity,”
6 
i.e. the inability of governments to achieve simultaneously the objectives of capital mobility, 
exchange-rate stability, and monetary policy autonomy. After 1992, in fact, the EC would be an 
area characterized by complete freedom of capital movements and a system of quasi-fixed 
exchange rates (the EMS), deemed necessary to facilitate intra-Community trade and thereby 
promote greater economic efficiency. Hence, it was illusory for member states to believe that 
they could retain the ability to conduct autonomous national monetary policies. The 
inconsistency of these three elements had already manifested itself during the 1980s, when some 
member states had either opted for flexible exchange rates and withdrawn from the EMS (e.g. 
the U.K.) or had been occasionally obliged to resort to capital controls (e.g. France and Italy). 
After 1992, however, the instrument of capital controls would no longer be available. Hence, if 
governments wished to retain their ability to make autonomous national monetary policy, they 
had to return to flexible exchange rates. If, on the contrary, they were willing to relinquish 
whatever national autonomy they retained in monetary policy, then they might as well move 
from the EMS to full currency union. 
 
Though a case could be made for returning to flexible exchange rates on the grounds that 
Europe did not appear to be an ‘optimum currency area’,
7 a number of factors combined to 
provide a favourable conjuncture for the re-launching of the currency union project.
8 First, and 
perhaps most importantly, currency union was the solution favoured by EC officials, especially 
within the Commission,
9 as well as by those political leaders who perceived the telos of the 
process of European integration to be the formation of a European federation. Officially, EMU 
was justified and sold by relying on the arguments that the single currency would lead to greater 
efficiency for the single market, eliminate transactions costs, and provide a stimulus to growth 
and employment.
10 The contention was also advanced that monetary union would solve the 
“unholy trinity” dilemma by transforming an already weak national monetary sovereignty into 
                                                           
6 Benjamin Cohen, “The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of International Monetary Cooperation,” in R. 
Higgott, R. Leaver, J. Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1993), pp. 133-158. 
7 Barry Eichengreen, European Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice, and Analysis (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1997). 
8 The most thorough analysis of the origins and developments of EMU can be found in Kenneth Dyson and Kevin 
Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999).   
9 Amy Verdun, “The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of EMU: An Epistemic Community?” Journal of 
European Public Policy 6, 2: 1999, pp. 308-328. 
10 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings, and the Genies  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Paolo Cecchini, The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single 
Market (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988); Commission of the European Communities, From the Single Market to 
European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992); Michael 
Emerson, One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and 
Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Paul Temperton (ed.), The Euro (Chichester: J. Wiley, 
1998).   4 
“enhanced joint monetary sovereignty”.
11 There is no doubt, however, that the view that the 
adoption of a common currency would promote a European identity, and thus contribute to the 
consolidation of the EC as a political union,
12 was paramount in the minds of the promoters of 
the project.
13 It was this realization, coupled with a divided public opinion, which led British and 
Danish politicians to opt out of EMU.
14  
 
A second and important factor was that throughout the 1980s European political elites, 
including social-democratic ones, had moved away from traditional Keynesian policies and 
converged towards neo-liberal ones. Their penchant for “minimum government” made 
agreement on a SEA built around deregulation and liberalization easier, while their preference 
for low inflation facilitated agreement on the structure of EMU, particularly on the choice of the 
status (independence) and main objective (price stability) of the European Central Bank. Even 
trade unions supported currency union, limiting themselves to argue that as a counterweight to 
the perceived deflationary bias of EMU, the EC should make an explicit commitment to promote 
employment. A specific title to this effect was introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. 
 
A number of more circumstantial variables also played a significant role in the choice of 
currency union.
15 For example, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the consequent prospect of 
German reunification, led some member states to regard reinforcement of EC institutions as the 
best way to avoid an institutionally weak EC being dominated by a bigger Germany. The 
solution of a currency union was particularly appealing since Germany (or, more precisely, the 
Bundesbank) was already perceived as playing a hegemonic role in the EMS.
16 Germany, for its 
part, traded its initial reluctance to adhere to EMU, and thus relinquish the mark, in exchange for 
unqualified support of reunification on the part of its EC partners. The adoption of a single 
currency was also regarded as necessary if the EC wished to be able to compete with the United 
States as an equal on the world stage. It was, after all, the perception that Europe was 
increasingly lagging behind the United States in economic growth that had led to the adoption of 
the SEA. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, domestic political and economic considerations 
also played a significant role. In Italy, for instance, EMU, and particularly the need to meet the 
criteria for admission to its third stage, was regarded as an ‘external constraint’ that would help 
                                                           
11 Commission of the European Communities, First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European 
Community Action (Brussels: European Commission, 1996), pp. 12-15. 
12 Although this contention is difficult to evaluate at this early stage, it is unlikely that the Euro will make a great 
contribution to the formation of a European-wide national identity. At best, having replaced national currencies, it 
will contribute marginally to the erosion of national identities. On the role of currencies in the promotion of national 
identities, see Eric Helleiner, “One Money, One People? Political Identity and the Euro,” TIPEC Working Paper 
01/6, http://www.trentu.ca/tipec/helleiner6.pdf (2001).  
13 Chris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 87-
122. 
14 In Sweden EMU was rejected by Parliament, while Greece did not meet the convergence criteria for entry into the 
third stage.   
15 The role of serendipity, as it were, is recognized by one of the participants in the process: “Even those of us who 
laboured to complement the single market with a monetary union and to embody such a transformation into a treaty 
held only that such a transformation was desirable and feasible, not that it was probable, or much less, inevitable. …. 
Thus we might speak of a benevolent historical conspiracy, but certainly not of inevitability” Padoa-Schioppa, “The 
Road to Monetary Union in Europe,” p. 9. 
16 Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European Monetary System 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).   5 
Italy bring its public finances under control by supplying clear objectives for fiscal policy and a 
supranational surveillance upon progress to attain them.
17  
 
To conclude, EMU was officially justified as a logical next step after the completion of 
the common market, a step that would reduce transaction costs and thus increase trade, and 
stimulate economic growth. These arguments, however, would have been not as successful -- 
after all, good economic counter-arguments also existed, most importantly that EMU would 
deprive national governments of their ability to use interest and exchange rates as instruments of 
economic policy – had it not been for the fact that EMU was also, and primarily, a politically 
driven process. First, there was the desire on the part of EC officials to make another significant 
step forward in the process of integration, a step that arguably had the potential to increase 
Europe’s role and visibility on the world stage as well as contribute to the formation of a 
European-wide ‘imagined community’. Second, and most important, national leaders that could 
have blocked the project did not because they saw EMU as an external factor that would help 
them attain domestic objectives (e.g. fiscal restraint in Italy, political reunification in Germany).  
 
The Canadian Currency Debate and the Euro 
The Protagonists 
Before analysing the details of the Canadian currency debate, it is useful to provide some brief 
background information on the “players” in the debate. The euro was, as indicated above, a 
central political issue in Europe in the 1990s. The debate over the euro was informed by “expert 
opinion” - typically economists – but involved also political parties, pressure groups, and even 
the public at large since, at least in some cases, its adoption was the subject of popular referenda. 
The scope and intensity of the debate in Canada instead has been of a much lower order. In 
Canada, the debate has mainly been between a relatively small group of economists either 
working in academia or for major financial institutions. The currency debate has been a long way 
down the political agenda although it has made sporadic appearances, largely at the behest of the 
Parti Québécois and the Canadian Alliance, and has reached the public mainly because of press 
coverage, especially by the National Post. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the leading proponents of a common currency have been 
Thomas Courchene, Herbert Grubel, Richard Harris, and Robert Mundell, all prominent 
academic economists. The proposals for a common currency were made by Courchene and 
Harris
18 in a jointly authored work produced for the C.D. Howe Institute and Grubel’s proposal
19 
was published by the Fraser Institute, both leading right-wing “think tanks”. The leading 
proponents are associated with the conservative end of Canada’s public policy spectrum. This is 
especially true of Grubel, a former Reform M.P., and Mundell, a long-time supply-side 
                                                           
17 Osvaldo Croci and Lucio Picci, “European Monetary Integration and Integration Theory: Insights from the Italian 
Case,” in A. Verdun (ed.), The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 215-240. 
18 Thomas Courchene and Richard Harris, “From Fixing to Monetary Union: Options for North American Currency 
Integration,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, No. 127, (Toronto: June 1999). 
19 Herbert Grubel, “The Case for the Amero: The Economics and Politics of a North American Monetary Union,” 
Critical Issues Bulletin (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, September 1999).    6 
economist who publicly endorsed the economic program of the conservative Canadian Alliance 
in the 2000 federal election.
20 They have been joined in their support for a common currency 
with the United States by some private sector economists, most notably, Sherry Cooper, a 
strongly pro-United States, pro-business economist at BMO Nesbitt Burns and a regular 
commentator in the financial press.  
 
The leading opponents of a common currency have been economists with Canada’s 
banks, most notably John McCallum when he was chief economist with the Royal Bank,
21 and 
economists with the (central) Bank of Canada, such as John Murray and Lawrence Schembri, all 
with strong academic credentials.
22 Successive Governors at the Bank of Canada, Gordon 
Theissen and David Dodge have also periodically entered the debate by affirming their belief 
that Canada’s flexible exchange rate system has served the country well. Other opponents can be 
found on different ends of the ideological/political spectrum. Among them one should mention 
Mario Seccareccia, an economist at the University of Ottawa, whose work was published by the 
left-leaning think tank, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and David Laidler, an 
internationally-known monetary economist with the University of Western Ontario, and a 
Canadian Bankers Association Scholar and Fellow-in-Residence with the C.D. Howe Institute. 
The range of political opinion found among the opponents should not be surprising because, 
although Courchene, Grubel, Harris and Mundell are prominent academic economists, their 
proposals are not particularly in keeping with mainstream academic opinion, which leans 
strongly towards flexible exchange rates for all but the smallest of the high-income countries.
23  
 
The Context  
The Canadian currency debate of the late 1990s owed a good deal to the impending birth of the 
euro. The decision of the EU to proceed with the launch of the euro focussed attention in many 
parts of the world on exchange rate and currency arrangements. Canada was no exception. The 
euro project has had a profound influence on the credibility of common currency arrangements 
and has acted as a catalyst for, and has provided credence to, proponents of common currency 
arrangements for North America. The advent of the euro has led many to speculate that the world 
is inevitably moving towards the use of fewer currencies.
24 Even opponents of monetary 
integration, such as John McCallum, conceded that if the world moved towards the use of three 
key currencies, an independent Canadian dollar would not survive as a fourth. The EU example 
shaped the intellectual agenda and made common currency arrangements the intellectual fad of 
the late 1990s even though, as Pomfret has pointed out, the collapse of the rouble zone meant 
                                                           
20 Even Harris, the least conservative of the four, is sufficiently conservative to serve on the Financial Post board of 
economists. 
21 John McCallum was a distinguished academic economist at McGill University before joining the Royal Bank, 
which he subsequently left to become a Liberal Cabinet Minister. 
22 John Murray has held academic appointments at the University of British Columbia and Princeton University, 
while Lawrence Schembri was economics professor at Carleton University before being hired away by the Bank of 
Canada, and he maintains a connection with Carleton as an adjunct research professor. 
23 See, for example, Robert Frank, Ben Bernanke, Lars Osberg, Melvin Cross, and Brian MacLean, Principles of 
Macroeconomics, 1
st Canadian edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2002), pp. 494-495.  
24 See Bowles, Croci and MacLean, “Globalization and Currency Convergence” for more details and a critique of 
this hypothesis.   7 
that Europe as a whole “had more independent currencies in 2002 than it had in 1991.”
25 This, 
plus the Canadian origins of Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell, widely described as the intellectual 
father of the euro and regularly featured in the news because of his Nobel Prize award, served to 
raise the issue of monetary integration to a higher level of public debate than might otherwise 
have been expected. The “temporal spur” given by the euro to the Canadian debate was explicitly 
recognised by many of the participants in the debate. For example, Courchene notes that “it was 
the advent of the Euro in January 1999 that unleashed a veritable flood of interest, papers and 
conferences on the evolution of Canada-US and North American currency arrangements.”
26 The 
birth of the euro was therefore important in focussing attention on monetary unions and provided 
a trigger for the Canadian currency debate. However, it was by no means the only factor that was 
important in this context and there were at least four other factors that played a role in placing 
currency arrangements on the public agenda. 
 
The first of these was that the debate took place in a political environment where the 
Canada-U.S. exchange rate had fallen sharply since 1991, which was often portrayed as being 
just before the Liberals took power at the federal level in 1993. Pro-business think tanks and 
political forces in Canada, including numerous business columnists, moreover, had repeatedly 
used drops in the value of the Canadian dollar as opportunities to criticize the status quo under 
the federal Liberals and to argue for more business-friendly policies.
27 Before Finance Minister 
Paul Martin’s February 1995 federal budget, drops in the Canadian dollar were met with calls for 
social program spending cuts to eliminate the federal deficit, bring down federal government 
debt, and prevent Canada from supposedly hitting the “debt wall” and experiencing currency 
collapse.
28 Later in the decade, after substantial cuts to social program spending had been 
achieved, the focus shifted to using drops in the Canadian dollar to call attention to the 
desirability of corporate and personal income tax cuts to make Canada more “competitive” with 
the U.S.
29 In this political environment proposals for a common currency with the United States 
                                                           
25 Richard Pomfret, “Monetary Integration in East Asia: Lessons from Europe,” paper presented at the 8
th 
Convention of the East Asian Economic Association, Kuala Lampur, November 4-5, 2002, p. 2. 
26 Thomas Courchene, “A Canadian Perspective on North American Monetary Union,” paper presented to 
NAEFA/ASSA session on “Currency Consolidation in the Western Hemisphere,” New Orleans, January 5, 2001, p. 
1. 
27 On an annual basis, the Canadian dollar has fallen from U.S.$0.87 in 1991 to U.S.$0.65 in 2001. The Canadian 
dollar was at a peak in 1991 associated with the unusually high interest rates the Bank of Canada had implemented 
to achieve its low inflation target, and 1991 therefore makes for a misleading starting date for calculations of the 
trends in Canada-U.S. dollar exchange rate (though not as misleading as using the highest daily rate from 1991). 
Over the period 1984-1987, for example, the Canadian dollar averaged about $U.S.0.74, which is not much different 
from the average value of the Canadian dollar ($U.S.0.73) over the 1994-1997 period. 
28 For a critical analysis of the tactics employed in the campaign for social program cuts, see Linda McQuaig, 
Shooting the Hippo: Death by Deficit and Other Canadian Myths (Toronto: Penguin, 1995). 
29 See Brian MacLean, “A Sherry Cooper Budget,” Policy Options/Options Politiques (April 2000), pp. 21-24. The 
explanation for the decline in the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar during the 1997-2001 period seems 
quite simple: the U.S. dollar had become overvalued relative to most other currencies, a fact that is widely 
recognized outside of Canada. For example, the latest version of the “Big Mac Index” published by The Economist 
(27 April 2002), has the subtitle: “In the history of the Big Mac index, the [U.S.] dollar has never been more 
overvalued.” To illustrate with a couple of specific examples, from January 1997 to April 2002 the Canadian dollar 
depreciated against the U.S. dollar by less than 14 percent, which is not much different from the 12 percent 
depreciation of the British pound over the same period, and is far less than the 31 percent depreciation of the 
Australian dollar. As 2002 unfolded, the U.S. dollar began to slide against a number of currencies, most notably the 
euro.   8 
were naturally given a high level of news media attention because they fit in with the long-
standing news media theme of treating the depreciation of the Canadian dollar as a very serious 
Canadian public policy problem.
30 The fallout from the Asian financial crisis, which saw the 
Canadian dollar hit an all-time low against the U.S. dollar in 1998 (although it fell to further 
lows in 2001 and 2002), added more grist to the mill.
31 
  
A second factor behind the Canadian currency debate was the emergence of the public 
perception in Canada that the United States was once again home to a highly dynamic economy. 
From the mid-1990s, when the Federal Reserve Board under Alan Greenspan decided to put to 
the test the hypothesis that the U.S. unemployment rate could not be allowed to fall below 6 
percent or so without triggering a surge in the inflation rate, until 2000, the United States enjoyed 
exceptionally rapid employment, productivity, and output growth.
32 The economic dynamism 
that the United States exhibited in the late 1990s, and the way that rapid U.S. economic growth 
translated into rapid expansion of Canada’s net exports to the United States during the same 
period, added appeal to claims that Canada should strive to be “competitive” with the United 
States, and that the two countries should become more highly integrated. Towards the end of the 
1990s greater integration with the United States sounded much more attractive to the Canadian 
public than it did as late as 1993 when the United States was seen as experiencing a “jobless 
recovery” and as declining in economic power relative to Japan. At that time, many Canadians 
attributed Canada’s economic ills to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and even the 
federal Liberals campaigned against the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  
  
A third factor behind the Canadian currency debate was the perception that the Canadian 
economy had become substantially dollarized, a perception which permitted some observers to 
argue that Canada might as well adopt a common currency with the United States because 
powerful market forces were driving Canada towards full dollarization anyhow. The perception 
depended on anecdotal evidence such as news stories about certain corporate CEOs as well as 
players for Canadian professional sports teams being paid in U.S. dollars.  In the absence of solid 
statistical studies, however, it was plausible for observers to assume, for example, that the strong 
upward trend in Canada’s trade with the United States since the signing of the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement would have prompted Canada’s trading firms to increase their trade-related 
U.S. dollar holdings.
33  
                                                           
30 Both the tax cuts theme and common currency arguments received special prominence in the pages of the 
National Post, established in 1998 by newspaper baron Conrad Black. 
31 For many Canadians, each new low for the Canadian dollar invited envious comparison with the strength of the 
U.S. dollar. They sensed that the depreciation of the Canadian dollar meant that their relative standard of living was 
in decline, and that it would be restored if the Canadian dollar were to trade at par with the U.S. dollar.  
32 Dean Baker, “NAIRU: Dangerous Dogma at the Fed,” Financial Markets and Society, Financial Markets Center 
(December 2000), pp. 1-16. 
33 More careful empirical analysis has since put a damper on this line of argument. In particular, in a paper which 
constitutes a major advance in the measurement of “dollarization” in Canada, argue that “existing data suggest that 
informal dollarization is proceeding at a very slow (to non-existent) pace. Indeed, by many measures, Canada is less 
dollarized now than it was twenty years ago, and bears little resemblance to those economies that are typically 
regarded as truly dollarized.” John Murray and James Powell, “Dollarization in Canada (The Buck Stops There),” 
paper presented at conference on Exchange Rates, Economic Integration and the International economy, Ryerson 
University, Toronto, May 17-19, 2002.  See also Mario Seccareccia, “North American Monetary Integration: Should 
Canada Join the Dollarization Bandwagon? University of Ottawa (February 2002).   9 
  A fourth factor is that the Canadian debate over a common currency with the United 
States took place during a period in which the sovereignist movement in Quebec came to see 
greater Canadian economic integration with the United States as a means of easing the transition 
costs of a move to a separate (or at least decidedly more sovereign) Quebec (Parizeau 1999: 8).
34 
Proposals for Quebec sovereignty have always raised difficult issues of what currency would be 
used post-independence and how continued use of the Canadian dollar could be negotiated with 
the rest of Canada in that event. With the adoption of a common North American currency, the 
sovereignists believed that this source of uncertainty would be removed, facilitating the re-
drawing of political boundaries within a larger economic unit. The sovereignist Bloc Québécois 
introduced a motion in the House of Commons to study a common currency for the Americas in 
March 1999, a motion which was defeated by 175 votes to 67 but, much to the chagrin of the 
Liberal government, the Banking Committee of the Senate did discuss the issue one week later. 
The Canadian Alliance (the successor to the Reform Party of which Grubel was a member) also 
supported the study of a North American common currency but support for such a study by 
sovereignist parties made its discussion a low priority for other mainstream federal parties. 
  
The birth of the euro, therefore, although instrumental in promoting the Canadian 
currency debate was only one among many, perhaps equally important, factors. We now turn to 
the use of the euro in the substance of the debate.  
 
The Economic Arguments  
Despite the relatively small number of participants in the currency debate, summarising the 
debate is no easy task because of the range of arguments that have been used, especially by the 
proponents of a common currency who have on occasion adopted an “everything but the kitchen 
sink” approach. Here, we focus on what we take to be the substantive parts of the debate. 
 
The economic arguments of the proponents of monetary union are largely the same as 
those which would be advanced in favor of a fixed exchange rate, a currency board, dollarization 
(i.e. the unilateral adoption of the U.S. dollar by Canada), or a common currency. The 
proponents recognize this but argue that of these four options, the common currency option is the 
most attractive. It is preferred economically to a fixed exchange rate since the increase in capital 
mobility over the past decade has made fixed exchange rate regimes more difficult to sustain, an 
argument which can also be extended to the case of currency boards, and only a common 
currency or dollarization offer an economically sustainable “superhard” currency fix. A common 
currency is politically preferred to dollarization because it offers the possibility of Canada 
retaining some voice in continental monetary policy making. 
  
There are four central economic arguments made by the proponents of monetary union.
35 
The first is that the volatility of Canada-U.S. exchange rates has inhibited cross border 
investment and trade, and therefore reduced economic growth. Faced with exchange rate 
                                                           
34 Jacques Parizeau, “Globalization and National Interests: The Adventure of Liberalization,” in Brain MacLean 
(ed.), Out of Control: Canada in an Unstable Financial World (Toronto: James Lorimer and CCPA, 1999), p. 8. 
35  In our summary of the arguments for monetary union we rely mainly on the analyses presented in Courchene and 
Harris, “From Fixing to Monetary Union,” and Grubel “The Case for the Amero.”   10  
uncertainty, firms plan conservatively and therefore investment is lower than it would be in an 




The second main argument used by proponents of a common currency relates to the 
effects of the secular decline of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar over the past 25 years 
or so.
37 Specifically, the argument is that the flexible exchange rate regime has served Canada 
badly, allowing its staple producers and manufacturers to seek solace in a depreciating exchange 
rate rather than in making the productivity-improving investments that Canada is deemed to 
need.
38 That is, a depreciating exchange rate is argued to have insulated Canada’s manufacturing 
and resource sectors from competitive pressures enabling them to minimize productivity-
enhancing investments and slowing down the structural transformation of the Canadian 
economy. In short, a depreciating dollar had cushioned “lazy manufacturers” in Canada.
39 This 
argument has some parallels – although Canadian proponents did not draw on them – to the 
reasons which led Giscard D’Estaing to launch the EMS proposal in 1978. It will be recalled that 
then it was argued that a fixed exchange rate system would force French industrialists to pay 
more attention to the curtailment of wage inflation. For Courchene and Harris, a fixed exchange 
rate system would force Canadian industrialists to pay more attention to productivity-enhancing 
investment. 
 
The third argument was a more general version of the productivity argument and was 
based on the view that monetary union would not only change the investment behaviour of 
Canadian industry but would also have wider impacts on Canada’s institutional structure making 
it more ‘flexible’ and ‘efficient’. A common conservative critique of the Canadian institutional 
framework has been that, in comparison to the United States, Canada is less flexible, less 
dynamic and more “welfarist” (to both firms and workers). Implicitly, the argument is that 
Canadian economic institutions and policy had ‘failed’ with the result that Canada had a 
persistently higher level of unemployment, and a lower productivity growth rate, than the United 
States. It is this more generalized failure that the proponents of a common currency sought to 
address. If adjustments to differential economic performance by the United States and Canada 
could no longer be channelled through the exchange rate, then they would have to be addressed 
by greater flexibility in other markets such as the labour market. Tying in with the U.S. monetary 
order would therefore force Canadian institutions to adapt and to become more like those in the 
United States: labour markets would need to become more flexible (read trade union power 
                                                           
36 Courchene and Harris, “From Fixing to Monetary Union.” 
37 In recent academic analyses, it has been usual to take 1977 or so as the starting point for analysing the secular 
decline of the Canadian dollar on the grounds that during the six-year period of 1971-1976 the Canadian dollar had 
traded roughly at par with the U.S. dollar. This is certainly more sensible than taking the early 1990s as the starting 
point for analysis, as many media pundits have done. Canada had pegged to the U.S. dollar at U.S.$0.925 in the 
spring of 1962, however, and maintained the peg until mid-1970, when the Canadian dollar was allowed to 
appreciate. In looking at long-run trends in the Canada-U.S. dollar exchange rate, then, while a starting point of 
1977 or so is customary, it is also inherently arbitrary. It establishes a period of unusually high commodity prices 
and hence a strong Canadian dollar as the norm against which subsequent exchange rate performance is judged. 
38  For more details of this argument, see Richard Harris, “Is there a Case for Exchange-Rate-Induced Productivity 
Changes?” in Revisiting the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, proceedings of a conference held at the Bank of 
Canada, November 2000, pp. 277-309. 
39 The argument is suspect from a standard, pro-market neoclassical perspective because by the same logic 
manufacturers should be spurred to increased productivity if unions impose strong wage increases upon them.   11  
reduced), firms to be more innovative, structural change to occur more quickly and for the 
government to be generally less interventionist. It is for these reasons that the currency debate 
found a wider resonance in the conservative media, especially the National Post, which has been 
at the forefront of the arguments for pro-business policies over the past decade such as lower 
government spending and lower taxes. 
 
The fourth economic argument was that patterns of resource endowment and industrial 
activities had already resulted in the emergence of significant cross-border regional economies. 
Thus, Courchene and Harris, for example, argued that the similarities of regional economies 
across the Canadian-U.S. border, rather than East-West economic similarities, indicated that 
Canadian regions had at least as much interest in a stable exchange rate with neighbouring U.S. 
regions as with other Canadian provinces.
40  
 
The economic arguments presented by the proponents of monetary union did not 
therefore appeal to European experience, even where parallels were available. The focus was 
very much on a common currency as a way of addressing the perceived dynamism and superior 
performance of the U.S. economy relative to the Canadian economy; it was the Canada-U.S. 
comparison rather than any analysis of the European case, which drove the argument. 
 
The opponents of monetary union were similarly focussed although they did make 
marginally more use of the European example in their arguments. Firstly, to counter the view 
that a flexible exchange rate had inhibited Canada-U.S. trade, opponents pointed out that there 
had in fact been a substantial increase in trade between Canada and the United States during the 
1990s. In 1989, when the NAFTA was signed, Canadian exports to the United States totalled 
US$108 billion and accounted for 73.5 per cent of Canada’s total exports. By 2000, however, 
exports to the United States had risen to US$360 billion and accounted for 85 per cent of 
Canada’s exports.
41 The fact that exports to the United States had surged under a flexible 
exchange rate regime was used by opponents to argue that common currencies were not required 
to spur trade integration.
42 That is, it was argued that the European model of monetary 
integration was not necessary to reap the benefits of increased trade and investment integration. 
 
With respect to the “lazy manufacturers” hypothesis, this was rejected at the theoretical 
and empirical levels. At the level of theory, the hypothesis implied that Canadian firms were not 
profit maximisers, and therefore inconsistent with one of the basic tenets of neoclassical 
economics. Empirically, it was argued that Canada’s inferior productivity performance was due 
to performance in just two sectors of the economy and could not, therefore, be generalised to an 
argument about Canadian industry as a whole.
43 The argument of a wider institutional failure in 
Canada was countered by the argument that, whatever institutional failings there might be, they 
were not to be found in the monetary sphere. Canada had, as Laidler pointed out,
  a stable 
                                                           
40 Courchene and Harris, “From Fixing to Monetary Union,” p. 16. 
41  See Statistics Canada – Cat. No. 11-210-XPB, 2000/2001, p. 59. 
42 As Seccareccia notes “already more integrated than most of the countries of the EMU, with almost 90 per cent of 
our trade being with the U.S., it would be difficult to envisage still further growth in what is a share that have 
practically reached its upper limit!”.  Seccareccia, “North American Monetary Integration,” p. 9. 
43 The two sectors were “industrial machinery and equipment” and “electronic and other electronic equipment”. John 
McCallum, “Engaging the Debate: Costs and Benefits of a North American Common Currency,” Current Analysis 
Royal Bank of Canada (April 2000), p. 7.   12  
“monetary order” and had lower inflation rates than the U.S. for much of the past decade.
44 The 
monetary regime should therefore be left well alone. 
 
The most prominent argument used by the opponents, however, was that it was precisely 
Canada’s position as a staple producer that justified the continued use of a national currency and 
a flexible exchange rate. That is, it is because Canada relied, relatively speaking, more heavily 
on commodity exports that its currency depreciated in times of global economic slowdowns as 
commodity prices weakened. The Bank of Canada, in its analysis, pointed out that it is this 
feature of the Canadian economy which distinguishes it from the U.S. economy and why a 
flexible exchange rate serves as a useful adjustment mechanism in the face of external shocks.
45 
Furthermore, adopting a common currency would not remove the need for adjustments to be 
made; it would merely move them to areas other than the exchange rate, such as nominal wage 
flexibility or labour mobility, where there are likely to be, at least in the short run until labour is 
sufficiently weakened, more protracted struggles and higher output costs. The fact that the 
United States and Canada did not meet some of the central criteria for an optimal currency area, 
added weight to the argument that independent national currencies and a flexible exchange rate 
were more appropriate.
46 These arguments, concerning the asymmetries of external shocks and 
the degrees to which labour markets adjust to shocks, can of course be found in European 
debates on the effects of a common currency. This, however, represents the application of 
common methodologies and theories by economists on both sides of the Atlantic rather than any 
particular borrowing from, or influence of, the European debate. 
 
This review of the economic arguments has illustrated the limited role that the European 
experience has played in debating the need for a common currency in North America. The 
arguments of the proponents were not based on a superior performance of Europe, a performance 
which might be attributable to its exchange rate regime. Rather, the argument in Canada was that 
Canada had performed poorly relative to the United States; it is here that the comparisons were 
made. The United States was seen as having a more dynamic economy, out-performing Canada 
in terms of job creation, productivity growth, and economic growth. However, while the 
economic case for the need to change the exchange rate regime was based on comparisons with 
U.S. economic performance rather than with Europe, the form that it should take, and its political 
governance structure, drew heavily on the European experience. 
 
 
                                                           
44 The issue of the performance of the Bank of Canada relative to the US Federal Reserve was debated, however, by 
Mundell and Friedman with the former particularly critical of the Bank’s record particularly under the disastrous 
“zero inflation” policy implemented under former Governor John Crow.  Robert Mundell and Milton Friedman,  
“One World, One Money? Symposium,” Policy Options?options Politiques (May): 10-30. 
45 See John Murray, Larry Schembri and Pierre St.-Amant, “Revisiting the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates in 
North America,” paper presented at conference on Exchange Rates, Economic Integration and the International 
Economy, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 17-19, 2002. 
46 See Murray, Schembri and St.-Amant, “Revisiting the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates in North America,” for 
tests of the asymmetric responses by Canada, the United States and Mexico to exogenous shocks. See also Jack Carr 
and John Floyd, “Real and Monetary Shocks to the Canadian Dollar: Do Canada and the U.S Form an Optimal 
Currency Area?” Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Working Paper UT-ECIPA-Floyd-01-02.   13  
The Governance Structure 
In advancing their arguments for a common currency, Courchene and Harris proposed a new 
common currency, the North American Monetary Unit (NAMU),
47 while Grubel suggested the 
‘Amero’.
48 In arguing for such a currency, they were clearly suggesting that Canada might be 
able to enter into a new currency regime with the United States on the basis of some presumed 
national equality and shared sovereignty. Courchene and Harris drew explicit parallels with the 
European model and argued that “the easiest way to broach the notion of a NAMU is to view it 
as the North American equivalent of the European Monetary Union and, by extension, the euro. 
This would mean a supranational central bank with a board of directors drawn in part from the 
central banks of the participating nations.”
49 Grubel, in discussing the governance structure for 
the Amero, proposed that the three NAFTA signatories adopt a common currency with each 
member country appointing members to a North American central bank “governed by a 
constitution like that of the European Central Bank.”
50 
 
  In making these proposals, the attempt was made to sell North America as if it was 
comparable to Europe and to suggest that joint sovereignty over monetary policy was possible in 
the same way that it was (imperfectly) exercised through the European Central Bank. To suggest 
that the regional political superstructures for European monetary governance were capable of 
being applied to the North American case was, however, an abuse of the euro example, as 
opponents were quick to point out. For example, McCallum (2000: 2) argued that “the European 
Union model, in which independent states share decision-making and sovereignty, is alien to 
American thinking and American history” and he described the United States as being “light 
years” away from allowing any other country a formal role in formulating U.S. monetary 
policy.
51 The absence of any discussion in the United States about sharing a new common 





The argument of this paper has been that the euro was important in acting as a temporal spur for 
the Canadian debate on currency regimes. However, the European experience of exchange rate 
management under the ERM and the economic performance under fixed exchange rates played 
very little part in explaining why proponents of North American currency union viewed this as a 
desirable policy option. Rather it was the comparison of Canada with the United States that 
played the central role in the debate. If anything, it was opponents which used the European 
experience in a negative way by illustrating that the trade growth between Canada and the United 
States in the 1990s did not require a European style fixed exchange rate regime. Where the euro 
did play a prominent role in the Canadian debate was as a model for North America, although we 
have argued that this was an abuse of the euro example given the vastly different capacities and 
desires to construct regional political institutions in Europe and North America. 
                                                           
47 Courchene and Harris, “From Fixing to Monetary Union.” 
48 Grubel, “The Case for the Amero.” 
49 Courchene and Harris, “From Fixing to Monetary Union,” p. 22. 
50 Grubel, “The Case for the Amero,” p. 5. 
51 McCallum, “Engaging the Debate,” p. 2.   14  
  Our discussion has also highlighted the way in which the temporal spur given by the euro 
was important in the period 1999-2001. However, other important factors were also identified to 
explain the reasons for the timing of the debate. The changes in these factors, and especially the 
end of the U.S. boom of the 1990s, have led to a considerable dampening of the public debate in 
Canada over North American currency arrangements. Writing in early 2003, the Canadian dollar 
has strengthened against a now weakening U.S. dollar, U.S. growth rates have fallen, and Canada 
has been outperforming its southern neighbour. In 1999-2001, when most of the literature which 
we have surveyed was produced, there was a widespread perception of Canadian economic 
performance relative to the U.S. that still reflected Canada’s “Great Stagnation” of 1990-1996 
and the U.S. boom of 1996-2000.  This, however, has changed and the arguments for a euro-style 
common currency for North America which, as we have seen, rested heavily on the Canada – 
U.S. comparison, have become much less prominent in the public domain as a result. 
 
This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the issue of North American 
currency union will remain off the table for an indefinite period. In the European case, we argued 
that the issue continued to resurface despite numerous interludes and setbacks caused by 
economic events. It kept resurfacing because it was driven essentially by political motives. For 
the same reason, the issue of a common currency in North America is quite capable of 
resurfacing at future points since it too is tied to a political agenda of achieving a more integrated 
continental economy and of promoting a convergence of Canadian economic institutions to those 
found in the United States. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 